Are Revolutions Inherently Violent?

“Are revolutions inherently violent?”


Within the complex nature of the process of “revolution” itself, we do not see any standard sequence of events or stages which must somehow play out in each transfer of power, except those which are inherent in the definition of revolution itself. In appraising first these values, we can begin to judge whether violence plays an inherently significant part in all revolutions. Firstly there comes the breaking of an existing political system - next a struggle and finally a subsequent re-establishment of a single system, supposedly replacing the old.[1] However, we must not confine the use of violence merely to the “struggle” phase - examples from history teach us that it can be entirely homogenous throughout all three stages. Therefore, in a concerted attempt to judge whether violence is inherent to the success of revolutions - we must ask whether direct change can be achieve through peaceful measures? Marxism stated otherwise, that in its penultimate stage would come the brutal ‘Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ where the bourgeoisie would be deposed through violent, and popular insurrection. Perhaps it was ultimately fitting that European Communism would end non-violently with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the realisations of Gorbachev’s “glasnost” policy. Perhaps it is something of violence which goes hand in hand with the popular appeal of revolution, the unbridled emotion and fierce implementation of Revolutionary “justice” no clearer seen than through the Terror following the French Revolution. Therefore, despite it’s short length, the proposed question offers much scope for debate and insight into the very nature revolutions have taken throughout history, and how their actions have shaped future insurrectionary movements worldwide.

A good starting point would no doubt be the French Revolution, with its obvious history of insurrectionary violence and instability. Baker, on writing about the invention of the French Revolution, notions to Rétat, claiming than in a revolution, “all remedies being exhausted, a crisis was necessary, and in these violent crises only strong constitutions resist.”[2] Using the word “crisis” alludes to the fact that the revolution was to be experienced as a terrifying moment of violence and danger, a period of agitation and subsequent anguish.[3] One can identify, throughout the early editions of Révolutions De Paris, a clear emphasis of the horror of revolutionary violence, to quote Rétat once more : “this day was frightening and terrible : it marked the people’s vengeance against its oppressors.”[4] Much use is made of the word “horror” to signify the basic carnage of the revolution. Reference is made to “terrible scenes” which have supposedly frightened foreign enemies of France - a clear indication into the bloody and brutal internal conflict within the Revolution. We can gather, using eyewitness accounts as primary sources, the discernable fact that violence was countrywide throughout the revolution. In a petition to the National Assembly in 1789 an individual draws attention to “a band of brigands” laying waste to his agriculture and land.[5] Herein we can identify that grievances, be they political or otherwise, were very often settled during the Revolution through standard use of violence. We can see, therefore, that the heightened tensions prevalent through Revolutionary times went hand in hand with the use of violence which would certainly most not have existed in ‘peace’ time. Furthermore from an eyewitness account of the September Massacres we can determine that the violence present during the French Revolution was uncompromising in its plan and execution - nobody, seemingly, was exempt. The eyewitness reports Princesses’ being “butchered in the most shocking manner”[6] and gives clear evidence of the indiscriminate nature violence often took in Revolutionary France.

Through this last example especially, we can see that Revolutions can often usher in new phases of extreme terror and violence - in complete antithesis to their supposed aims at regenerative peace. We may draw illuminating comparisons at this point between the French and Russian examples of Revolution. In the example of Russia, it is possible to suggest violence as a way of life - a continuous presence throughout the course of a prolonged revolution dating from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 until the brutal civil war in 1918 and beyond into Stalin’s Terror. Thus is we comply with the assertion that every revolution produces a backlash against it - do we not see as violence playing an inherently significant role? Terror, therefore, is no longer a response : it is an anticipation, an instrument which galvanised Revolutionaries throughout history. Terror must not be seen as a consequence of Revolution, but an aspect of it and therefore inseparable from it. Of course, we may argue that perhaps violence is a unique characteristic of the Russian social discourse - yet to note that periods of supposed “Revolution” go hand in hand with unprecedented levels of agitation and violence would be mostly very valid. Perhaps this might help explain why the policies of collectivisation under Stalin resulted in such extreme reaction from the Russian peasantry - that Russia has been through a period of total and continuous warfare, both external and internal. This process thus intensified after the Bolshevik seizure of power, making the Stalinist Terror all the more likely. Revolution as a concept may well then exacerbate pre-existing tendencies for violence - giving such acts a moral and social justification. We see violence again, in both Russia and France, as the fulfilment of ‘Revolutionary Justice’ - the enactment of the revolution through the most extreme means. The order for intensified Red Terror[7] on September 4th implies this fact ; “not the least wavering, not the least indecision in the application of mass terror”. Furthermore, the examples of Russia and France show us that the permeation of violence throughout the Revolutionary period is not always consistent. The storming of the Bastille in France and the Winter Palace in Russia were met with very little resistance, yet had immense symbolism for the success of both Revolutions. Many historians have sought to explain the use of Terror in the aftermath of Revolution as a continuation of the violence that was prevalent to the displaced old regimes. Yet, comparing the amount killed between the old regimes and the post-revolutionary eras, a clear pattern suggests the death toll is much heavier on the latter. Therefore, is the violence of the Revolution something different than just a continuation of old habits? The concept of virtue through terror is perhaps applicable here, that only through ultimate sacrifice and terror would the true potential of the Revolution be realised.

However, to label all insurrectionary movements as inherently violent would perhaps be a generalisation. The examples of Danton and Mazzini in France and Italy respectively show the emphasis also placed on an ideological yearning for a better system of government. Danton’s campaign was to induce a favourable change of climate among the public by means of journals.[8] Mazzini’s attempt at intellectualising the liberal elites within Northern Italy, notably through creating Young Italy, stressed non-violent techniques and methods. Yet we may make an interesting point here, that only amongst liberal upper-class intellectuals and thinkers were ideas of non-violence promulgated. The importance of violence within Revolution lies at the grass-roots of any nation, its peasantry and industrial working class. We may use this argument to detract importance away from such writers as Danton and to unrest created by those with real life grievances. Violence was a conceivably rational means to any supposedly morally defensible cause.[9] In both France and Russia, there were peasant revolutions that were emancipatory in their consequences, that was not merely a ritualistic expression of violence but exhibited choices of targets and tactics guided by reason. To peasants in Revolution, violence was the only way of conveying their displeasure and achieving their aims. The peasantry in Russia had been violently rising up against landlords since 1861, similarly in France. Yet there is very little written material to provide evidence for such peasantry violence - it is more likely that the use of violence was more social than political, a way of settling old scores, far from being politically motivated. However, that would not be to deny that the existence of such a violent mindset undoubtedly adds to the systematic use of violence during a perceived Revolution. Furthermore, we may add an increased role of violence within Revolution if we see military struggle as a part of any Revolution. The Russian Civil War and the Piedmontese Wars in Italy provide excellent examples here. Garibaldi stated that “it is not with shouts or applause that we should fight the enemies of our country, but with weapons and the shedding of blood.”[10] Clearly, the violent implication is self-evident - yet what this also shows us is that ideology and rigorous speech is never enough to force change, successful revolutions depend therefore upon a struggle. Without such a struggle, without galvanising grass-roots support for a revolutionary cause (as Castro infamously did in Cuba), there can be no Revolutionary victory as the established institutions do not crumble at mere words. Mazzini, for example, experienced little long-term success as he showed little interest in the material grievances that lay behind the discontents of the artisans and urban workers.[11] One may argue that Mazzini’s contribution to the question of whether revolutions are inherently violent or not is great, in that he showcases Revolutionary failure through non-association with direct action. He stated, “all great national enterprises have ever been originated by men of the people, whose sole strength lay in that power of faith and will”[12] - when contrasted with Garibaldi’s militaristic approach, we can clearly see why the latter was infinitely more successful in bringing about Revolutionary change.

To be angry does not necessarily mean that one is blinded by anger, and to be violent does not mean that one’s actions are unreasoned[13] - rather, it is the ultimate expression of dissatisfaction with a particular situation. Revolutions are borne of such dissatisfaction - and therefore the violent response is expected and justifiable. Violence can exist within the initial stages of Revolution, perhaps even pre-dating the historically given starting date for Revolution, like the emancipation of the Russian serfs in 1861. It can, furthermore, exist within the transitional period - the struggle phase is characterised by a violent upheaval. Lastly, the aftermath of Revolution is further littered with violence as the necessity of “Terror” to back the changes of Revolution becomes necessary. Robespierre noted that, “If the dynamic of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the dynamic of popular government in revolution is both virtue and terror.”[14] The primary examples used, that of France and Russia, show that violence both pre-empted and followed Revolution. In both cases such violence tended to be more extreme in the aftermath of Revolution, in the attempt to hold onto power - the Terror in France and the Civil War in Russia. What must be emphasised is that existing institutions do not merely crumble, they must be shook. Of course, the obvious exception is that of the Provisional Government in 1917, yet we may take this as an exceptional circumstance due to its inherent weakness. Revolutions cannot achieve their consistently radical aims without some form of the more powerful form of expression - that of violence. The spread of such violence through all spectrums of society implies this very fact, that violence is omnipotent within Revolution - the two go hand in hand. In recent years bloody internal conflicts have erupted worldwide, in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Chechnya - all display certain qualities of “Revolutions”. Such Revolutions and their internal violent civil wars are now common than interstate wars. Moreover, a resurgence in ethnic and religious identifications, and the increasing polarisation between Eastern and Western values, have been cited as worrisome portents of conflict to come. The rise in international terrorism, genocide and the continued repressiveness of both Left and Right wing regimes around the world has made political violence through Revolutionary intent a part of everyday politics. Take for example South America in the 20th Century, it was a hotbed of regime instability, political violence and Revolutionary overhaul of governments. Cuba has already been cited, but we may also include Argentina - the overthrow of the Batista regime and the countless Right-wing coups in Nicaragua, often sponsored by CIA financed insurrectionists.

The common theme that connects all of these is that of violence - its prevalence through the origins, the actions and the aftermath of Revolution underline the stated argument that Revolutions are, indeed, inherently violent. Such a degree of political change requires, it may be argued, an extreme reaction in order to force such change.



Bibliography

Primary Sources :-

H. Butterfield, Select Documents of European History vol.III 1715-1920 (London, 1931)

“Intensification of the Red Terror”, 4-5 September 1918, in Documents of Soviet History (1991), vol.1

“Petition to the National Assembly, 20 August 1789” from the Comte de Germiny, in J. M Roberts, ed., French Revolution Documents (1966) vol.1

Report by Col. Munro on the September Massacres of 1792, in O. Browning (ed.), The Dispatches of Earl Gower (1885)

Preamble to the Constitution of 1791, in Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789(1970)

Alexis de Tocqueville, L’Ancien régime et al révolution (1856), (ed.) J.P Mayer (1967)

Gen. Giuseppe Garibaldi from D. Mack Smith (ed.) Garibaldi

“Civil War in the Pipe Factory”, 20 May 1917, in R.P Browder, A.F Kerensky (eds.), The Russian Provisional Government 1917 (Stanford, 1961), vol.2

Secondary Sources :-

R. Chartier, Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Duke University Press, 1991)

S. Schama, Citizens : A Chronicle of the French Revolution (Penguin, 1989)

G. Kates, The French Revolution : Recent Debates and Controversies (Routledge, 1998)

T. Blanning (ed.), The Rise and Fall of the French Revolution (Chicago, 1996)

J. Davis, Conflict and Control, Law and Order in 19th Century Italy (Macmillan, 1988)

O. Figes, People’s Tragedy : The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924 (Pimlico, 1997)
[1] R. Price, Revolution and Reaction : 1848 and the Second French Republic (London, 1975)pp238
[2] K. Baker, Inventing the French Revolution (Cambridge University Press 1990) pp222-223
[3] IBID
[4] Pierre Rétat, Les Révolutions de Paris en 1789 in Labrosse : L’instrument péridodique (Lyon 1986) p139
[5] “Petition to the National Assembly, 20 August 1789” from the Comte de Germiny, in J. M Roberts, ed., French Revolution Documents (1966) vol.1 pp.140-1
[6] Report by Col. Munro on the September Massacres of 1792, in O. Browning (ed.), The Dispatches of Earl Gower (1885) pp.226-9
[7] “Intensification of the Red Terror”, 4-5 September 1918, in Documents of Soviet History (1991), vol.1, pp.214--215
[8] Description of Georges-Jacques Danton’s political principles and hopes in J. Garat (trans.) 1793-94
[9] G. Kates (ed.) French Revolution : Recent debates and new controversies (London, 1998) pp112-118
[10] Gen. Giuseppe Garibaldi from D. Mack Smith (ed.) Garibaldi p63
[11] J. Davis, Conflict and Control : Law and Order in 19th Century Italy (Macmillan, 1988) pp88-91
[12] H. Butterfield, Select Documents of European History vol.III 1715-1920 (London, 1931) pp40-41
[13] G. Kates (ed.) French Revolution : Recent debates and new controversies (London, 1998) pp112-118
[14] Maximilien Robespierre, translated extracts from speech to the Convention by the Committee of Public Safety (5 Feb. 1794) in M. Bouloiseau & A.Soboul (eds.) Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre (1967), vol.10, pp.352-3

The British Class System

“British society was so obsessively conscious of status distinctions that it was singularly lacking in class consciousness. Divergent social identities within classes and between communities were always much more significant than perceptions of a uniform class interest.” Was this equally true for all classes throughout the period 1870-1951?


Class has been one of the most dividing topics in modern British social history. Its nature has been notoriously difficult to define. Perhaps the polar opposite views come from Marx and Thatcher : the former seeing a simple division in society between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat with extreme class consciousness and an emphasis on class warfare. Thatcher reduced class to nothing more than a mere “communist creation”. We, therefore, may begin to look between these two more extreme views to assess how the nature of class affected British societal life. For where Marx may well be criticised is in attempting to fit a uniform pattern of class to all industrialised countries - this was a key mistake, as it must be recognised that Britain has its own unique set of institutions, cultural habits and political norms. With regards to politics : a clear divide among historians has developed, between those who believe that the growth of the trade unions and rise of the political Labour Party reflected a growing class consciousness among the working classes, and those who refute these claims : arguing that the British political scene was never as polarised as others made out. We must recognise, however, that Labour, the Liberals and the Conservative Party were never single class parties, and the trade unions were never wholeheartedly behind the Labour Party, its membership rarely over 50% of the industrial workforce throughout the whole period. This was not merely a political pattern : evidence has been cited to support the view that there was little homogeneity in working-class communities. Furthermore, that upon the exclusion of the middle classes from party politics (after the decline of the Liberals after 1918) they retreated to comfortable lives, often in the suburbs, caring not for perceptions of a uniform class interest.

A fitting starting point would, however, be the quintessential theorist on class : Marx. The oft-quoted, “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” provides a telling glimpse into the nature of the Marxist argument. Marx’s solution, which proved immensely influential, was to classify individuals in collective groupings, according to their different positions to the means of production. In the land-owners, bourgeois capitalists and proletarian workers Marx classed all of human society, and it was the perpetual conflicts between them that the essential motor of the historical process was to be found. The struggle between the groups represented, initially, an economic one : finally resulting in a political conflict in which the proletariat would seize power and engender socialism. Yet the extent to which Marxist ideology permeated through the British classes is highly questionable. There was very little political agitation, especially in comparison with other Western European states. The Chartist upheavals of 1839, 1842 and 1848 brought about what seemed to be serious social trouble - but they soon fell flat and it was decades before the working class recovered any sense of identity and political will. For some historians, the failure of the working class to carry through a successful proletarian revolution during the early part of the 19th century created an example of something which Marx had said would happen, which had failed. Marxist theorists have responded with the argument that during the late 19th century the pace of social change began to pick up again, bringing with it a renewal of class consciousness and supposed conflict. The rising bourgeoisie and declining aristocracy fused together into a composite capitalist ruling class - exemplified through the era of Tory dominance, rigid imperialism, Joseph Chamberlain and the Boer War. The continued growth of big business and the scale of production involved meant that the working class supposedly developed into a new and self-conscious force : reformed with two interconnected institutional expressions, the trade unions and the newly emergent Labour Party.

There can be no denying that trade union membership grew rapidly : from 759,000 in 1888 to 4.1 million in 1914. This coincided with the political growth of the Labour Party, and after 1918, it succeeding the Liberals as the natural party of opposition. Indeed, Labour’s adoption of Clause 4 in 1918 alluded to Marxist theory, calling for “the common ownership of the means of production.” With the fall of the Liberals the way was open therefore for political class conflict, as the party of industrial capital confronted the party of organised workers. Many have thus argued that it was in this context in which we may view the social and political conflict of the 20th century, culminating in confrontations such as the General Strike in 1926 and strikes in 1979 and 1984. However, the consensus reached before the end of World War II does seem to challenge this view of the polarisation of party politics. Attlee’s program of nationalisation and welfare spending was not changed dramatically upon the return of the Conservatives to power in 1951. Furthermore, Stanley Baldwin often sought conciliation with the Labour Ministers in the House of Commons : showcasing that perhaps politics were not so divided between “right” and “left”. However, detailed empirical research has consistently undermined these speculations. It is now clear that the pattern of economic development, which provided the basis for the Marxist model, was not as simple as a three-tiered society. Significant changes in the economy (such as the growth of industrialisation and subsequent urbanisation) were never so straight-forward or so pervasive as to bring about the creation of those homogenous, self-conscious classes of landlords, capitalists and labourers locked in perpetual economic and political conflict with one another. We may further identify inherent divisions within Marx’s societal groupings. For example the divisions between aristocrats and landed gentry, bankers and businessmen, industrialists competing for the same markets and the many gradations of skilled and unskilled labour : the two biggest industries, textiles and coal, both labelled as ‘proletariat’ often had contrasting ways of life, societal norms and political allegiance.

The social structure of modern Britain was more elaborate, integrated and layered than Marx had allowed. The simple, direct connections so previously readily assumed between economic change, the making of a class and subsequent class antagonism must all be vigorously challenged. Furthermore, McKibbin has furthered this school of thought, arguing that there was no place for the development of Marxist politics in Britain : and that the Labour Party was a party based on moderate reform, rather than class warfare. Groups like the Social Democratic Federation under its Marxist leader Hyndman claimed to follow some form of Marxist ideology : yet they were either absorbed into the Labour Party or torn apart from internal bickering and debates about theory and tactics. McKibbin stresses that Britain, by the 20th century, was by definition a working-class nation. About 85% of the total working population were employed by others - 75% as manual workers and always less than 12% in agriculture. However, on closer analysis the huge British proletariat disperses itself, and its ‘collective’ element becomes remarkably thin. Trade union membership was never particularly strong - in 1901 of an employed workforce of 13.7 million, little under 2 million, 15%, were unionised. On the eve of World War I 75% of the male work force were still non-unionised. In many cases trade unions were not the radical organisations employers often perceived them to be - often using their block vote to stop reform and 40% did vote against joining the Labour Party. Furthermore, the comparative failure of the unions in the unskilled trades implies that any political party would have as much difficulty organising them into a cohesive body. It is certainly highly unlikely that unskilled or even service sector occupations which were so resistant to unionisation would be any more susceptible to an ideologically specific political party - particularly as so many of the trades encouraged an individualistic, rather than a collectivist, attitude.

McKibbin draws further attention to the argument that class consciousness was unlikely to be in a relatively advanced state through arguing that, “the industrial organisation of the British economy was small scale.” Yet, it is certainly not true that size necessarily discourages the transmission of political radicalism. It is noticeable that the SDF flourished in Burnley, a town of small textile plants. However, because the patterns of employment were so fragmented localised political communications and group loyalties became multi-layered. Such fragmentation tended to impede working class politics : the structure of the economy thus tended to narrow the base of any political collectivism. Furthermore, capitalism, with its enduring entrepreneurial essence, was never truly despised : the success of the Hornbys’ in Blackburn and Chamberlain in Birmingham demonstrated how the structure of industry could foster a political and social affinity between masters and the common man. Poverty has also been highlighted as a factor : the sheer struggle for survival demanded so much time and physical energy that there was little of either left for any kind of active politics. The instability and overcrowding of working class domestic life discouraged any sense of collectivity, in such conditions, R. A. Bray wrote, “people drift apart, the one from the other”. Tensions within working class communities almost certainly undermined local solidarity, many communities were undivided with real differences of income and status causing acute resentment. Therefore, it is possible to view many directly influencing factors contributing to a non-perception of uniform class interest. Rising real wages has been suggested as a further factor inhibiting the spread of socialism or any other ideology linking the proletariat together. Sombart, in his U.S study, argued that high real wages in themselves partly accounted for the lack of socialism there. However, in Britain, wages rates well into the 20th century had nowhere near reached a point where socialism ‘must’ become unattractive. It seems plausible that they can be considered a part of a wider social context - wages did permit most activities that made up working-class pastimes such as the development of organised hobbies, mass sport, popular betting and commercial affordable entertainment. Working class parties hoping to unite the proletariat politically therefore had to contend with an existing and entrenched working class culture which was stable and relatively sophisticated. Popular culture had always provided contexts within which workers could mix irrespective of status or skill. Street markets, public holidays, fairs and parliamentary and local elections had always been arenas in which workers mixed regardless of their status or skill.

McKibbin thus makes for a convincing case that the context of British industry, rather than aggregating and collectivising the workforce as Marx suggested, in fact scattered it throughout an industrial and mercantile world where the collectivised part of the workforce was in minority to the whole. Masterman wrote of the ‘English working man’ that he is, “much more allied in temperament and disposition to some of the occupants of the Conservative back benches.” Joyce has furthered this claim, emphasising the importance of territorial aspects of ‘community’. Concepts and beliefs in nation, region, town and neighbourhood produced a multiplicity of outcomes, class being only one of the ways in which people patterned and gave meaning to a wider, all-encompassing social order. His remark that, “class in England was largely built up out of the often mismatching components of distinctive local and regional experiences” carries considerable validity. However, the area that has spawned the most heated debated has been in the relation of the rise of the Labour Party to the question of working class consciousness. Savage and Miles have been leading exponents of the view that despite some inherent weaknesses within the Labour movement, the rise of the Labour Party was still an even of considerable importance to the working class. Early Labour historians, such as Pelling, also regarded its rise as a dramatic event, which marked the entry of the working class into the political arena - thereby signalling the beginning of a new political era. McKibbin argued, as has been shown, that there is no reason to entirely suppose that the working class is necessarily attached to Labour politics. Clarke has further emphasised the popularity of the Liberal Party during the period 1900-1914, in which it attempted to devise policies which would appeal to working class voters (Lloyd George’s People’s Budget 1909, for instance). The ability of the Conservatives to appeal to the working class has also often been underestimated, Joyce demonstrated the strength of popular Conservatism in areas such as industrial Lancashire. In the period after 1900 it was the Conservatives who led the way in adjusting to the increasingly democratic franchise by providing a range of popular bodies and institutions to garner electoral support : after all, the Conservatives held office for 18 out of 21 inter-war years. Reid has further claimed that the rise of the Labour Party was not due to any explicit enthusiasm for socialist politics, or to the development of a more militant or united working class, that the growth of Labour did not mark a fundamental break from older patterns of trade union loyalties and sectionalism, but simply their continuance under a different guise.

Debate thus shrouds the extent to which the growth of the Labour Party influenced working class unity. Savage and Miles remark that, “while the Liberals were able to contain the Labour movement, the were not able to absorb it.” This claim is justified : after the defection of the mining union MP’s to the Labour Party in 1908 trade unions no longer sought political influence through the Liberals. Furthermore, after World War I, the dependence of the parliamentary Labour Party upon the trade unions became much less and, according to Savage and Miles, the crucial factor behind the consolidation of the Labour Party lay in its growing role as an urban party able to draw upon the neighbourhood bases of support from uniquely working class communities. They further criticise the view that the stable monolithic working class never existed : “the working class is constantly being made and remade, and the political implications of class formation are often ambiguous and uncertain.” Did, therefore, the working class develop an unprecedented social and political presence in British society? Lawrence questions just how strong trends were towards working class homogenisation, with specific reference to refuting the belief that classes were ‘segregated’ in British communities. Exponents of this argument have referred to the flight of the urban middle classes out to the new suburbs, leaving Britain’s towns and cities to become dominated by increasingly cohesive working-class communities. These communities, it is argued, were no longer subject to the social and political influence of middle class elites, and became core areas for the growth of the new Labour politics. Savage and Miles offer an account of urban changes around the turn of the century, stressing particular that it was during this period that Britain’s cities began to become more stable social environments as migration slowed and households tended to move less frequently. Yet the exaggerate the growth of social segregation. Migration to the suburbs was by no means a uniquely middle class phenomenon and there is at least as much evidence of intra-class as inter-class residential segregation, with even the poorest areas often retaining their smaller middle lass elite of shopkeepers and publicans. To use the term ‘working class neighbourhoods’ can easily obscure processes of residential segregation between different groups of manual workers. The Board of Trade’s 1908 inquiry into the cost of living for the working class says of East Ham, “the whole of the borough is working class in general character”, even thought the 1901 census suggests that almost 30% of the adult male population were employed in clerical, professional or commercial enterprises. The report offers further revealing insights into the residential patterns of Edwardian Britain. Analysis of 115 British towns does not provide substantial support for the existence of monolithic one-class communities by the 1900’s. 19 % refer to some degree of clear physical segregation between manual and non-manual workers. A further 12% refer either to working class housing being scattered throughout the borough or to significant working class migration to the new suburbs, whilst 16% refer to some degree of physical segregation between skilled and unskilled workers, or between artisans and the ‘poor’.

There are therefore strong grounds for rejecting the idea that growing working class homogeneity provided the vital catalyst either for the emergence of independent Labour politics or more generally for the rise of class politics. All this is not to say that some extent of class antagonism never existed in Britain. Historians have often been struck by the violent imagery of class discourse throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Bullock remarks that the 1926 General Strike represented “the frank recognition by both sides that industrial relations had become a running class war and the concession or rejection of wage demands symbols of victory or defeat for one side or the other.” Many have further noted that the First World War effectively marginalized the middles class from the political scene, Askwith noting that, “the war tended towards big organisations in both capital and labour.” The Liberal Party was the political vehicle of the liberal and intellectual professions - Masterman saw “Liberalism crushed between truculent labour and an equally truculent capital.” Waites agrees that there was a shit towards ‘class conflict’ and general consciousness : and cites Edwardian amateur sociology as having identified working class colloquialisms of the era. They reported the working classes using phrases such as “the likes of us” and “the higher ups”, indicating a growing awareness of societal status. It would, surely, be generalising to give the entire impression that the simple class dichotomy of capital and labour entirely replaced the discussion of class in three-fold terms. Yet it is true that by 1919 organised labour and the working class were more interrelated than they had ever been : and social problems such as low wages were seen more in the light of capital-labour conflicts. Waites proposes that “the war was conducive to a more deeply divided society” and there is some evidence to support this. The editorial on “the class war” from the 1922 Transport and General Workers Union journal states : “the war of today is not a war between armies, equipped upon a basis of equality, but a war between an impoverished multitude, against a handful of well-fed financiers and captains of industry.” Of the middle classes, McKibbin cites that they were in some cases united behind their class interests : but this was never antagonistic as has been identified with their working class compatriots. The common theme is that the middle classes lived relatively separate and individualistic lives away from one another, united only in dislike of that which threatens them. We must not ignore the creation of proactive organisations such as the Middle Class Defence Organisation in 1919. Yet, as similarly experienced by the different sub-sections of the British proletariat, the diversity of interests was highlighted acutely by the war, the relative impoverishment of sections of the middle class led directly to the relative prosperity of others. This is, to a large extent, due to the huge diversity of professions evident within the broad term ‘middle class’. Coupled with the growing trend of suburbanisation, which resulted in clear separation between work and home lives, resulting in a general restricting of social horizons. This led to many middle class men and especially women (usually forced to leave work when they got married or had their first child) becoming socially narrow, and therefore contributing to a minimal sense of class consciousness.

Evidence has thus been given to provide support for the argument that there was a clear lack of class awareness : throughout the period distinctions of status and region were far more important than perceptions of a uniform class interest. Of course, there are opportunities for claiming that this might not have been the case as strongly with the working class. However, the figures of trade union membership and voting statistics show that members of the working class often had very different principles and political loyalties. They were, by no means, a uniformed class, neither economically nor politically, and therefore Marx’s socialist prophecy could not be fulfilled.


Bibliography

J. Lawrence, Speaking for the People
A. Reid, Social classes and social relations in Britain 1850-1914
P. Joyce, Visions of the People
B. Waites, “War and the language of class” Extract 46 in P. Joyce (ed.) Class
D. Cannadine, Class in Britain
M. Savage and A. Miles, The remaking of the British working class 1840-1940
R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures 1918-1951
R. McKibbin, “Why was there no Marxism in Great Britain?” in English Historical Review 1984
J. Benson, The working class in Britain 1850-1939

Oil and Political Authoritarianism : A Match Made in Heaven?

“Why have oil and political authoritarianism so often gone hand in hand in Middle Eastern states since World War II ?”


The discovery of oil precipitated massively changing times for the Middle East : oil was the resource that transformed the Arabian peninsula from an isolated and impoverished preserve of the British Empire to an area upon which the world economy had come to depend. The oil wealth was used on the one hand to generate huge material and social changes in the producing states of the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), and on the other hand to prevent changes in the existing political order - thus presenting a seemingly contradictory pattern of modernisation and conservatism, of rapid development coupled with political restrictions and the preservation of monarchical rule. By the latter stages of the 20th Century, as the Cold War drew to its finale and independent democratic states began to spring up - the Middle East, to a large extent, remained a bastion of authoritarianism : based either upon religion, royalty or a compromise of both. Simply put, therefore, oil presented a fantastic opportunity for the leaders of Middle Eastern states to enrich themselves and their nations, whilst also keeping a firm grip on power : popular resistance was often silenced through generous welfare systems and high salaries. However, there remains a further element to the question : that of the political authoritarianism exercised not only by the Middle Eastern states, but by the great powers of Europe, the Soviet Union before its collapse and the United States. To these powers, the interests of oil combined with the pressures and strains of the Cold War to vitally affect foreign policy in the Middle East. Therefore the duality between oil and political authoritarianism is twofold : firstly represented in the entrenched and monarchical regimes within the Middle East, characterised by lack of political opposition and mass enfranchisement, and secondly the actions of other powers in the Middle East to protect their petroleum interests : witness the Suez Crisis in 1956, or the U.S led invasion of Iraq in 1990 and both represent armed intervention to ensure the survival of crucial oil imports.

The period since World War II, with regard to oil and international affairs, can be marked by two general events. Firstly, the Cold War : with its polarising effect upon Europe, spread to the Middle East and involved the producing states of the region in a battle between accepting financial aid, through the Eisenhower Doctrine, from the U.S, going it alone, or even making ties with the Soviets. We can identify instances of all three, Jordan and Kuwait financing their lavish domestic spending from oil revenues and a heavy influx of financial assistance from the U.S, Egypt in the period of Arab-socialism and Nasser defying the great powers by nationalising the Suez Canal and Mossadiq’s failed attempt to nationalise the Iranian oil industry in the 1950’s. Secondly, as important as the geopolitics of the Cold War, was the 1973 oil crisis precipitated by the Arab-Israeli War : which saw the ball shift dramatically to the court of the producer states in setting prices and limitations to the importers. However, the relationship between oil and political authoritarianism can perhaps be traced to the primary discovery of oil in Iran and subsequent development of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Reza Shah, after surviving Mossadiq’s nationalisation era, consolidated an authoritarian monarchy in which political activity was severely restricted : and fostered generally good relations with the Western powers. The shah was not without social reformist ambitions, but was totally unwilling to tolerate challenges to his power - establishing a system of government that rested on the narrow base of royal authority supported by the army and secret police. This authoritarianism was supported and financed by oil revenues and the backing of the Western importers. The hatred towards this relationship was no more vociferous in the 1950’s than from the National Front’s leader Mossadiq, who called for the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry and an end to the British stock-dominated AIOC’s financial hegemony. The popular demands resulted in the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1951, followed by a US and Britain sponsored boycott of Iranian oil which plunged the nation into a financial crisis. Here we see the first example of “economic warfare” being waged by the Western importers in the face of a popular nationalisation movement : a method that was later to be used against them in the Arab boycott of 1973. Thus, economic prosperity in Iran was connected with monarchical authoritarianism and a positive relationship with the oil importers. The lengths to which the importers would go to in order to secure their oil interests were clearly highlighted by the assistance of CIA agents in the coup which successfully overthrew Mossadiq. The NF’s leader had attempted to attack the entrenched institutions of the Shah’s Iran : to replace his personal rule with the rule of constitutional law and to redistribute the wealth and land of the elite. The threat posed by this, not only to the leaders of Iran, but also to those benefiting economically from Iran’s oil were thus considerable enough to assist in a military-backed coup against a popular leader. Thus authoritarianism combined from two angles : the Iranian elite and international powers, both connected in political will by their prosperity from oil revenues.

Mossadiq’s overthrow thus marked the triumph of the forces to whom he was opposed, the 1953 coup brought about the return of royal dictatorship and an intensification of US interference in the domestic affairs of Iran. The arrangement after 1953 saw Iran take a 50% share of AIOC profits, providing the Shah with ever-increasing revenues and thus consolidating Iran’s positive relationship with the Western powers and to a program of limited economic development on the Western model resulting in substantial infusions of US aid. However, despite the capital available, authoritarianism increased - the Shahs dealt harshly with the groups that had opposed him during the Mossadiq premiership - the National Front was disbanded and its leaders imprisoned, from 1953-79 political freedom simply did not exist. The two-party system adopted by the Shah to provide the appearance of democracy was so tightly restricted that the Iranians referred to the two organisations as the ‘yes’ and ‘yes sir’ parties. Advancements were made, certainly, the ‘White Revolution’ inaugurated in 1963 ushered in major economic and social changes but no change in the traditional system of authoritarianism. Spending from oil revenue was not directed towards improving the infrastructure of the nation, or improving the lives dramatically of the poor citizens - but mostly on defence and the military. Encouraged by the US, the Shah used Iran’s wealth to acquire advanced weaponry, spending more than $10 billion on arms between 1972-76. Here we see the Cold War context at its most obvious : the US was determined to use Iran as its Western-styled bulwark against communist agitation in the Middle East, and did this by providing arms and financial aid : and making a tidy profit in the meantime. All this does not mean that limited attempts at development were not made : it does, however, suggest that Iran under the Shah crafted its priorities out of the politics of oil and finance. The income from payments made by the AIOC played an important role in the life of the country. Attempts at socio-economic development were made, mostly instigated by US field experts, like the 1947 Morrison-Knudson report stressing greater efficiency and productivity in agriculture. However, despite all the post-war planning and some sincere desire by leading government officials to utilise the oil revenues for positive socio-economic development the developments in conjunction with overseas consultants proved a failure. Many Iranian business leaders became impatient with the foreign experts and in efforts to ‘speed up’ the changes, disregarded crucial advice. The oil revenues helped the government with its budget, many of the officials connected with the industry no doubt enriched themselves - yet the majority of the population remained as impoverished as ever. Basic economic ills were not greatly eased from oil revenues. Iran therefore : due to a mixture of bureaucratic inefficiency, selfish self-interest and US directed arms purchases, was not able to utilise the profits gained from oil for necessary social services or economic development. Therefore oil and political authoritarianism went hand in hand within Iran before 1979 : both internally and externally.

The example of Iraq provides a different angle from which to explain the relationship between oil and authoritarianism. Similarly to the AIOC, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) had exploited the wealth of Iraq’s oil reserves for the interests of Western business and development. However, after the 1958 revolution : each of the regimes that ruled attempted to acquire control of the nation’s petroleum resources - in 1972 the Ba’th regime, frustrated with the IPC’s unyielding stance over prices, proclaimed the nationalisation of the company. The magnificent profits gained allowed the regime to embark on a program of industrial development and social reform, on a scale far greater than that of Iran. The Iraq case showcases how an unpopular militant and authoritarian regime could entrench itself by using oil revenues to improve certain aspects of society, thus quietening opposition. The government was able to reduce taxes, subsidise basic foodstuffs, establish free health care and abolish university tuition fees. Though the Ba’th regime may not have been popular, the prosperity that accompanied its power led to its ultimate acceptance. Once more we see oil being used to confirm and entrench political authoritarianism : the educational system was used to propagate Ba’th doctrines and to monitor the nation’s political behaviour. Courses in Bath’ist ideology were mandatory for all university students and the regime ensured that only party members received faculty appointments. Similarly to Iraq, Saudi Arabia used its enormous oil wealth for a similar kind of social welfare system to consolidate the position of the tremendously wealthy royal Sa’ud family. King Sa’ud made no distinction between the state treasury and the royal purse, squandering millions of personal indulgences - his financial irresponsibility almost drove the state to bankruptcy and he was duly replaced in 1964 by Prince Faysal. The Kingdom’s first oil concession was granted by Sa’ud in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of California with terms immensely favourable to the company. However, the creation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1960 and its Arab equivalent (OAPEC) in 1968 helped the producer states have more say in oil production and pricing control. Thus, Saudi Arabia generated huge amounts of wealth from its oil reserves : devoting, similarly to Iran, huge sums to defence, but also to a program of social and economic development designed to keep back political challenges to the monarchical regime. Material developments such as improvements in transportation, communications, stunning universities and secondary industry plants helped create a new indigenous middle class. Yet despite this new classes education and growing responsibility for managing the machinery of government, its members were duly excluded from participation in political life.

Thus, the royal family in Saudi Arabia maintained its control over policy-making and refused to sanction political parties or labour unions, as Sadaam Hussein’s Ba’th party did in Iraq. Both regimes were entrenched by the enormous wealth afforded to them by oil revenues. Both hoped to survive by rewarding the elite with well-paying positions and providing the population with good welfare services. Faysal justified his decision not to issue a charter of rights, proclaiming that, “Saudi Arabia has no need for a constitution because it has the Qu’ran, which is the oldest and most efficient constitution in the world” - as the protector of Islam, the royal family thus justified its power, made possible by the existence of a mutually beneficial relationship between the monarchy and the religious establishment, placing the ulama and imams on the payroll of the state. This pattern can also be seen in the smaller Gulf states : the affluence they have acquired since the 1950s and even more so after the creation of OPEC and the 1973 embargo has helped enable the ruling families to strengthen their political authority - in an age that has largely abandoned the concept of government ruled by hereditary royal families, these Middle Eastern states do stand out as exceptions. Kuwait stands out as the only state to provide a limited forum for political discussion by the creation of an elected national assembly in 1963. However, the franchise was severely restricted, open only to adult males whose ancestors were resident in the country before 1920. However, the national assembly did not restrict the political authority of the ruling royal family. Key governmental posts were held by family members and policy was determined in special family councils. From oil revenues, Kuwait had the ability to provide its citizens with a comprehensive cradle-to-grave welfare system. In the case of Oman, Sultan Qabus ruled as an absolute monarch, the nation had neither a constitution nor a legislature : all power was concentrated in the person of the Sultan and ministries were headed by members of the ruling family. Thus oil developments fuelled a development boom of immense proportions among the Middle Eastern states. Yet amid the material improvements and social changes, political power remained in the hands of hereditary dynasties (with the exception of Iran after 1979). These families attempted to preserve their authority by preventing the emergence of representative assemblies and mass politics, often using oil profits as a buffer against any calls for change.

Thus the link between political authoritarianism and oil has been explicitly shown for the Middle East states themselves. However, this authoritarianism was also compounded by external forces, seeking to either entrench or remove the heads of power in such oil-rich states. The Cold War’s unique geopolitics dictated that neither the US nor the Soviet Union could directly and militarily involve itself in the Middle East for risk of destructive global warfare. Thus, each side carefully manoeuvred and combined economic interests of oil with the political interests of ideology : gaining allies in the region was thus key. Therefore, this helps to explain the US’s support of the Shah’s Iran, Jordan and, of course, Israel. Exacerbating this further was the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, causing the cost of oil to soar as a result of the Arab boycott. After 1973, access to oil, rather than its price, became the driving force behind the West’s policies towards oil-producing states. We may thus witness that, with even more desperation, the oil importing countries sought to shore up ‘friendly’ monarchies that ruled in the oil producing states in order to preserve the political status quo of the Middle East. Iraq’s attempt to alter that status quo by annexing Kuwait in 1990 was thus met with a massive international armed response. Behind the rhetoric about the liberation of Kuwait lay a more practical motive for military action - Kuwait provided the US and Europe with dependable access to reasonably priced oil, thus the stability of the Arab Gulf monarchies and their continued willingness to sell oil to the West were essential to Western economic well-being. Therefore we may explain armed intervention in the post-Cold War climate throughout the Middle East with reference to the crucial need for oil in modern and developed economies. The end of the Cold War thus changed the situation dramatically, primarily by freeing the hand of the US to deploy military power in the Middle East.

Oil thus had a dual effect upon the continuation and expression of two different forms of authoritarianism. Firstly, profits gained in the Middle East ensured the survival of autocratic royal regimes and secondly, the necessity of oil from the importers resulted in intervention, either economically or militarily and a further definition of authoritarianism, only this time imposed from abroad. Whether the first case endures remains to be seen, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 showcased the appeal throughout the Middle East of popular Islamic movements and as revenues declined throughout the 1980’s and 90’s citizens of the Gulf retained the expectations they had adopted during the oil boom. The second, however, appears to be stronger than ever : with US military hegemony in the region undisputed, a heavily armed US-backed Israel present too, demand for oil seems certain to go hand-in-hand with at least some form of political authoritarianism for the foreseeable future.

Chaing Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Failure in China

Why was the Nationalist government unable to bring stability and prosperity to China?


There is no doubting that the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek faced considerable problems from their 1927 conception all the way to their eventual, and perhaps inevitable, displacement at the hands of Mao’s communists in 1949. There appears to be a divide between historians : those whom conclude that the Nationalist government established a sound system of rule and good foundations for future development and democracy : only to be ruined by the invasion of and subsequent war with imperial Japan. Others contend that the government was corrupt and seriously inefficient, out of step with the vast majority of the Chinese population : most notably those in rural areas. However, ultimately it failed : and therefore the second line of argument must be taken and developed : to investigate the internal and external factors behind the demise of Chiang’s regime. The Nationalists decision to implement an old-school style of bureaucratic control at local government level, often seeing to be allied with the warlords of yesteryear proved ultimately disastrous : as did their neglect of the agricultural sector of the economy. As for stability, we may well question whether this was ever going to be possible under such a fringe regime which did so well in alienating support and distancing itself from the population at large. Ultimately, it would prove the Nationalist’s ignoring of this ‘population’ which would drive a considerable chunk of potential support into the hands of the communists, especially in the countryside - and thus the government was totally unable to bring either stability or prosperity to China.

Supporters of the Nationalist government have argued that economic depression, foreign invasion and civil strife were surely conditions beyond the control of the Nationalists. They point to achievements by the government : most notably, the positive reversal of territorial disintegration of China. Under the Nationalist government, China became more unified and centralised than ever before : albeit achieved through military means. By 1936, Chiang had consolidated political control over the greater part of the nation. However, in expanding the Nationalist’s borders so extensively : he allowed, crucially, for weakness in the provinces : and should instead have contented himself with the nominal allegiance of various provincial leaders and endeavoured to create a modern and efficient model of political, economic and social reform which may well have prevented further civil war. We may thus make a judgement concerning the failure of the Nationalist government to bring prosperity to China through analysing the economic policy and implementation of the government. The overwhelming agricultural nature of the Chinese economy must first be noted, it accounted for 65% alone of net domestic product. However, under the Nationalists - land reform and legislation was not forthcoming, the much vaunted 1930 Land Law was prevented from becoming legislation. The ratio between population and food production was somewhat addressed - the government undertook a broad and vague program to increase the farmers’ productivity through sponsoring research on new seed varieties and pesticides. However, these projects had a minimal impact - less than 4% of governmental expenditure was devoted to economic development during the 30’s. Franklin Ho wrote, rather revealingly, that “nothing went beyond the planning stage at the national level between 1927-37.” The Nationalist government thus did little to reduce rural impoverishment - which was especially acute in the wake of the 1929 World Depression and several dreadful bouts of weather. However, one may question whether the problems were indeed too great to be solved in a decade or so, certainly we must not overlook the considerably negative situation the Nationalist government was faced with.

Despite the problems faced by the government : the bitter decade of the 30’s brought about a sharp reduction in the already low standard of life for millions of Chinese people, economic hardship, in rural China especially, was endemic and worsened after 1937. Considering agriculture and other traditional based non-urbanised sectors accounted for 87.4% of the national income : it is certainly possible to criticise the Nationalist government for not implementing more reform and show real effort to tackle China’s rural problems. Of course, situations did not help : the invasion of North China especially saw a crippling of farm production and breakdown of the commercial links between town and countryside. Natural disasters further prevented the government from tackling its rural demons, such as droughts and floods, the Yangtze flooded in 1931 for example. Throw civil war into the mix, prevalent throughout the 20’s and 40’s and you have altogether a nightmare situation. Critics of the Nationalist government have thus stressed its lack of focus on rural matters resulted in its eventual demise : and point to the agricultural recovery, which by 1952 had returned output to pre-1949 levels being based on the success of a new and effective government ready to deal with agricultural matters. The largest criticism we may perhaps hurl at the Nationalist government may well be its reluctance to deal with the countryside : and focus only on the smaller urban sectors of the economy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Nationalist government reported in 1937 that 3,935 factories had registered : of the factories reported, 590 only were in existence before 1937 and 3,168 had been established during 1938-42. However, even when focussing on industrial matters, the Nationalist government certainly did not produce unparalleled success. After 1942 industrial activity began to slow down due to levels of inflation and industrial output stagnated and decline especially between 1937-40. Therefore the Nationalist government crucially mismanaged the Chinese economy : from 1931 Chinese farmers experienced a sharp fall in income and a striking reversal in terms of trade - brought about dually by economic depression and governmental policies, or lack thereof.

Yet, we must not lose sight of the economic depression that undoubtedly played a significant role in creating added pressures for the government to deal with : even under communism, with the emphasis firmly on investment and research in agriculture, China’s farm output continued to lag behind. Perhaps it may well be that China had inherent problems with its economy : for instance, few of the 19th/20th Century innovations in seeds, implements, fertilisers and insecticides had found their way into rural China. Indeed, from examining land ownership statistics we may realise fully the extent of the Chinese ‘rural’ problem, which may be considered to be out of the hands of the Nationalist government. From a land survey taken in the late 1930’s of 16 provinces, the average holding of 1,295,001 owners was 15.17 mau. But the 73% of families owning 15 mau or less held 34% of the total land, whilst the 5% of families owning 50 mau or more held 34% of the total land. Therefore, economically speaking, the Nationalist government clearly made severe errors in judgement with regards to government spending, research and implementation. However, there also were existing problems facing the government : ones which had existed in China long before Chiang’s KMT came to power in 1927. Therefore, the analysis concerning the Nationalists failure to bring prosperity to China has been largely examined : however, in dealing with stability we need to delve into the party structure, maintenance and ideology.

Eastman comments, “the Nanking regime was born of factional strife and bloodshed” - indeed, the KMT consolidated its grip on power in 1927 through a mass series of killings directed towards suspected communists. Upon taking national power the regime was faced with considerable problems : all of which should be illuminated when assessing why the Nationalists were unable to bring stability to China. The government had to turn back the tide of national disintegration that had existed for over a century : a central government had ceased to exist, political power devolved into the regional hands of militaristic warlords concerned only with their own wealth and enhancement of military force. Many believed that Nationalist rule marked the beginning of a new and cohesive era of a unified, strong China. However, with regards to stability, it would be the internal power struggles combined with the external war with Japan that would make it impossible for the Nationalists to stabilise China. After 1928, once Chiang had finally consolidated his grip on the party, he proceeded to alter the character the government took. So began radical purges within the party, most notably of those on the Left : the purge of the socialists had a negative effect, leaving those members who rarely worked at grass roots level behind and removing from the revolutionary movement those with passion, vigour, discipline and commitment to the cause. By 1929 the left wing of the party had been more or less fully suppressed : Chiang’s decision to go after this element of the KMT would have important repercussions, driving into the eager hands of the communists many experienced and intelligent revolutionaries. Further to this, Chiang instructed the youth of the party, prone to left-wing idealism, to leave the party : further driving a stake between the Nationalists and the communists. Between 1929-31 the party was stripped of most of its power and ceased to play a role in the formulation of policy. Instead, Chiang relied on old-style bureaucrats and the army to consolidate his power. By 1929, 4 out of 10 ministries were headed by these types : one disillusioned member commented, upon leaving the party, “the party is nearly usurped by the old mandarin influence.” The effects of this ‘mandarin’ influence were far-reaching : lust for power, disregard for the public (especially in the countryside) and values, attitudes and practices of the old warlord regimes had been harnessed by the Nationalists : a crucial error, and one which contributed immensely to the governments inability to provide any stable platform for political and economic growth.

Indeed, even as late as 1946 - reformers surveyed the corruption of their government and attributed it to the political opportunists and bureaucrats favoured by Chiang throughout the period of rule. Furthermore, the pervasive influence of the army proved deeply unpopular : under Nationalist rule, the army became the preponderant element of rule rather than the government or party. Strikingly, of the party leaders (members of the Central Executive Committee) 43% in 1935 were military officers. 25 out of 33 Chairmen of the provinces controlled by the Nationalists between 1927-37 were generals. Connected with the importance of the military to the Nationalist regime was the militarism of the various provinces dealt with by Nanking. Chiang’s crucial mistake was to institutionalise the position of the provincial militarists, thus allowing these warlords to become autonomous organs that legitimised their regional dominance, and inadvertently continuing the ‘rural’ problem that so afflicted rural China. Of course, many were defeated in battle, which served only to further the instability and chaos throughout the nation : such as the victories over the Kwangsi in 1929 and the Northern Coalition in 1930. Perhaps even more significantly however, was the invasion of Japan in 1931 and subsequent war after 1937, which seriously economically destabilised the nation and served to exacerbate China’s internal problems, despite initial attempts to ‘come together’ in the face of the imperialist foe.

However, aside from external factors such as the Sino-Japanese war, institutional factors too played their part in the Nationalists’ inability to bring stability to China. Franklin Ho wrote, “the real authority of the government went wherever the generalissimo [Chiang] went.” As a result of this the government, as a policy-formulating and administrative organisation, languished. Much of the civilian apparatus within the legislative branch of government had neither the finance nor power to implement its proposals. The civil government remained subordinate to the interests of Chiang and the military : which created even more of a chasm between the Nationalists and much of public opinion. Further to this, the Nationalists targeted particularly politicised groups such as trade unions and students for repression. After 1927, the leadership of China’s labour unions was replaced with agents of the regime and independent union activities prohibited. Also during the student revolts of 1931-2 and 35-6 thousands were thrown into prison and students were terrorised by the presence of government informers in their classes. The Nationalists thus alienated them and pushed these groups politically leftward, many allying with the communists. This push leftwards played into the hands of a group long-repressed by the Nationalists : who, in stark contrast to the government, exercised an extremely successful policy of popularising and supporting peasant movements in the Chinese countryside. The communists could not have won power in 1949 without the peasant armies and support of so many villages. Equally so, without the communists, the peasants would never have conceived the idea of revolution : therefore the two are inextricably inter-twined. Disillusioned communists successfully channelled energies into the three major peasant discontents : rent, interest and taxes and they successfully prevented an alternative to the Nationalists whom were seen to identify only with the landlords in the countryside. Bianco draws attention to the marked increase in riots with relation to tax during the Nationalist government’s tenure. There was also a significant number of other anti-fiscal riots : their targets, usually governmental civil servants and tax collectors. The communists clearly realised the military potential of the peasantry : clearly showcased from events such as the Lung-t’ien incident in December 1931 when tens of thousands of peasants attacked a detachment of 2,500 soldiers. Thus, the peasants, without possessing a strong sense of class consciousness were clearly disillusioned with Nationalist rule : the spontaneous orientation of peasant anger suggest they were far more conscious of state oppression than of class exploitation. The sheer scale and variety of disturbances clearly highlights the peasantries alienation from the Nationalist state : the communists’ vital achievement was thus in turning this potential into action. One man crucially responsible for uniting communists with peasant communities was P’eng P’ai whose overall success was remarkable. He discovered that setting up a peasant associated proved difficult at first - but once the step was taken to address the peasants on their level about issues that primarily concerned them, members flocked : the communists won peasants and artisans over to their organisations by adapting to the peasant’s world : something which the Nationalists more than failed to do. No link existed between the Nationalists and the peasants : a vital reason in the reasoning behind the inability of the government to bring stability or prosperity to China.

Throughout the Nationalist reign, the civil bureaucracy remained corrupt and inefficient : the government failed to identify with the people, but rather stood above them. The crucial error on behalf of Chiang’s government lay in not allowing the politically mobilised elements of society to become involved in the processes of government. The communists had begun providing the organisation that could convey peasant discontents into political power : but the Nationalists had the chance to turn the countryside into a powerful ally : instead it allowed it to become economically impoverished and politically hostile. Over-bureaucratisation, economic mismanagement, general inefficiency and too many links with the ‘warlords’ of old created innumerable problems for the Nationalist government. Add to this already long list the extensive external problems faced by Chiang’s government - such as severe economic depression and invasion from imperial Japan and it becomes no great surprise that the Nationalist government was unable to bring both stability and prosperity to China.

The Cuban Revolutionary Movement

“Why did Cuba have the most successful revolutionary movement in the Caribbean?”


The second half of the 20th Century witnessed multiple revolutionary attempts at government overhaul in the Caribbean and South America. With the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua, they failed amidst a tide of internal dissent within the revolutionaries ranks and brutal repression. The biggest success story, undoubtedly, is that of Castro’s July 26th Movement in Cuba. Therefore, what made Cuba different from the struggles, say, in Grenada or the Dominican Republic? There are certainly political factors : such as the unpopularity of the Batista regime, geographical factors : such as the mountainous nature of Cuba giving advantage to the guerrillas - but also historical factors : such as Cuba’s tradition of anti-imperialistic rebellion. Castro’s History Will Absolve Me highlights many of these features unique to Cuban political life : and thus attempts to justify the success of the revolution in these terms. The Cuban example has clear advantages when compared to other revolutionary movements of the period. Excellent leadership and loyalty can be cited as one case, as can the weakness of Batista and the reluctance (until 1961!) of US intervention. Added to this was the crucial local support given to Castro’s insurrectionists - where other movements throughout the region failed to convince multiple sectors of society of the validity of the cause, Cuba’s exploited working class (and, indeed, many petty bourgeoisie) became vital supporters of Castro’s movement. The failures of attempted coups after Cuba’s success in 1959 suggests that Cuba was unique in June opponents of dictator Trujillo landed in the Dominican Republic but were killed upon landing - there were no survivors to carry the fight into the mountains, as had occurred in Cuba. The implosion of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada later in the century also highlighted the extent to which internal divisions had hampered revolutionary movements in pan-America - Castro’s grip on power was secure, the Cuban insurrectionists suffered few of these problems, and thus succeeded where others failed.

Castro’s infamous 1953 History Will Absolve Me speech, coupled with Che Guevara’s writings on the art of guerrilla warfare provide an excellent primary blueprint helping to explain the success in Cuba. Castro makes strong reference to Jose Marti, the hero of the Cuban anti-imperialists in the 19th Century, imploring, “I carry on the teachings of the Master [Marti] in my heart, and in my mind the noble ideas of all men who have defended people’s freedom everywhere.” Cuba remained under Spanish rule until the very end of the 19th Century - anti-colonial activity was almost continuous, the very nature of the Cuban poor was rebellion towards foreign rule. Further to this, Castro makes a vicious attack upon the Cuban establishment : questioning the Batista regime’s political legitimacy and its popularity with the soldiers, small businessmen and sugar plantation workers - “the dictatorship that oppresses the nation is not a constitutional power, but an unconstitutional one”. Castro duly highlights the many ills of the regime : from its corporate dealings damaging Cuba’s sugar-dependent economy, to its vicious repression at the hands of the SIM secret police. As early as 1953 Castro seems convinced the people of Cuba are already on the side of the revolutionaries, remarking that “If Moncada had fallen into our hands, even the women of Cuba would have risen in arms.” Castro makes his case to each sector of Cuban society : and in this we may see one of the unique factors within the Cuban revolutionary movement, it was able to appeal to large cross-sectors of society - rather than isolated one group, Castro went for them all. He appeals to the soldiers, claiming they are being used by the Batista regime - to the unemployed, the seasonal sugar plantation workers without “an inch of land” to call their own, exploited industrial workers, small businessmen burdened with debt and young professionals with “all doors closed to them”. The five revolutionary laws to be implemented by July 26th appealed to broad sections of society - and thus strengthened the popularity and extent of support behind the movement. Constitutional power to the people, ownership of land to tenant farmers, workers given a 30% profit in large industries, sugar planters a right to share 55% of production and confiscation of illegally gotten property made for a sweeping and popular program of revolutionary change. Crucially, we may also add to this freedom from the American political and economic straitjacket - “Cuba should be the bulwark of liberty and not a shameful link in the chain of despotism.” This would have received extra support uniquely in Cuba due to their relationship with the US, the existence of the Platt Amendment and the United Fruit Company dominating the Cuban political and economic scene. Anti-Americanism was a recurring theme in mainstream Cuban politics and media : one Havana newspaper proclaimed in 1922 after unwelcome developments in the sugar industry, “hatred of North America will be the religion of Cubans.”

The question that must be asked therefore, is why did the US not intervene sooner to prevent Castro’s victory in 1959? They certainly had the capacity, as they had shown in investing arms and ‘military advisors’ in Vietnam for many years. Cuba’s geography may well have helped - Castro’s insurgents were holed up in rugged and mountainous terrain that few regular forces could penetrate. Maybe it is with the US’ relationship with Batista in which we may identify the inherent weakness of the latter’s regime. The US needed local instruments through with to project power - but it had aligned itself with a flawed, weak, corrupt, ineffective and deeply unpopular regime it ultimately could not control, similarly to Chaing Kai-Shek in China or Diem in South Vietnam. We could also tie in the popularity of Castro with the inaction of US intervention - the US could not control or crush such a strong leader or stem the cascading popular support his movement generated. It also may be seen that US officials over-estimated the ability of the Cuban armed forces. The Cuban military was corrupt, ill-trained and poorly commanded - the will to fight was lacking among Batista’s troops, especially when compared with the dedicated guerrillas. Castro makes reference to this also - “the army suffered three times as many casualties [at Moncada] as we did - because our men were expertly trained.” The lack of US involvement may also have been down to the perceived notion that Castro was not a communist - deeming the situation manageable when compared to events such as Berlin and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the non-involvement of the US undoubtedly gave Castro’s forces an added advantage. Witness the ease with which the entrance of the US military ended progressive forces in Guatemala in 1954 and Grenada in 1983 and it is clear just how much of an advantage Castro had not facing US wrath before success in 1959.Thus, the uniqueness of the Cuban revolution derives from a set of conditioning factors - socio-economic popularity of the revolutionaries’ program, leadership and the interaction of Cuban history with world (specifically with regards to the US) politics.

The revolutionaries appealed to the sectors of society disenchanted with the Batista regime : such as the large black population - Castro found it highly advantageous for discrediting Batista to propound the ‘instant liberation’ for thousands of previously disadvantaged black Cubans. Furthermore, the key area of conflict and thus future revolutionary policy was undoubtedly the countryside. Illiteracy, poverty, dreadful health and seasonal unemployment were all rife - there were few schools, fewer clinics, bad roads, impure water supplies and little electricity. The country’s substantial resource base was only partially exploited, for the advantages of the few businessmen in control, and under foreign control. The popularity enjoyed by the policies of July 26th can therefore be no surprise when looking at the situation in the countryside under Batista. With regards to leadership, the revolution was incarnate with Fidel Castro. Because of Castro’s dominant personality and political effectiveness, Cuba’s revolutionary progress was not paralysed by inter-elite struggles as befell many other insurrectionary movements in the Caribbean. With regards to Cuban history, Castro skilfully portrayed the struggle as rooted in decades of imperial exploitation and a popular and essential one. Castro’s Cuba was a child both of the contemporary times and the centuries-old Cuban revolutionary tradition - a truly popular indigenous movement sufficiently shaped by Cuban history, geography, economy, culture and personalities. It would therefore be wise to identify the failings of the insurrectionary movements elsewhere and compare conditions with those of Cuba. Take the example of Venezuela - most of the guerrillas were disenchanted members of the military and middle class parties - they could not forge a link with the people and thus ultimately failed. Yet, even when guerrillas attempted to achieve their aims by making common cause with the aspirations of the indigenous peasants they often still failed - as in the cases of Peru and Bolivia. In the latter case, even with the heroic Guevara aiding the guerrilla’s efforts they were betrayed by Monje, the leader of the Bolivian Communist Party and hunted down by the oppressive regime and CIA. Perhaps the most similar example to the Cuban case came from Nicaragua. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) gained power in 1979 after gaining momentum in the 1970’s through garnering peasant support in the north central regions. Similarly to Batista, the Sandinista’s position as viable opposition was given credence by the abuses committed by the dictator Somoza. Despite ideological rifts, the rebels overcame their factional differences and accepted the leadership of the most moderate faction - thus accomplishing its objectives through the creation of a multi-class alliance, similarly to Cuba, that coalesced to overwhelm the resistance of a redundant dictatorship.

Most guerrilla movements have been defeated because of lack of unity, lack of popular support or US intervention paired with guerrilla’s ignorance of local conditions. The overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala by a coalition of forces, including the CIA, highlights that even sometimes popular support and policies were not enough. The revolutionaries in the continent were able to draw important lessons from the Guatemalan experience : a revolution which did not go all the way in dispossessing the wealthy and giving the peasants and poorer classes a solid stake in the revolution. Furthermore, the case of Peru further highlights certain factors present in Cuba yet not elsewhere, that thus contributed to the failure of other insurrectionary movements. Luis de la Puente and members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) chose to emulate the Cuban rebels and being a guerrilla struggle in the Andean countryside in 1962. However, ignorant of the peculiarities of the terrain and betrayed by one of his closes followers (unlike the loyalty of the Cuban guerrillas) and unable to win the support of the people, de la Puente was killed in 1965 by the army. In three years the guerrilla movement had been totally liquidated - with the urban centres and mountain regions failing to act in support of the guerrillas. Add to this the disagreement which existed within the left - the Peru case showcased the futility of squabbles between Trotskyite and Communist factions within a revolutionary movement, which, as we shall see, ruined the New Jewel Movement’s chances of rule in Grenada. In Peru, the guerrillas lacked the necessary ability to adapt rapidly, not only to the terrain, but also to the daily life, language and customs of the peasants - as has been the priority of the July 26th Movement. Ideas promoted by the Peruvian revolutionaries appeared remote to the peasants, who were interested in local demands whilst the guerrillas advocated intricate and theoretical socialist revolution.

Therefore the factors which propelled Castro’s rebels to power were also the same factors for the failures of other movements across Latin America and the Caribbean. When movements across the region attempted to perform a copy-cat revolution akin to Cuba, they invariably failed. Local dynamics and structures had to be taken into account - as has been highlighted, Cuba was unique in its political culture, geography and economic situation. It certainly appeared as though Grenada would be the first predominantly black state to emulate Cuba and carry through a successful armed socialist revolution in 1979. The Cuban government astutely noted in 1983, of the revolution’s failure, “the division among the Grenadian revolutionaries led to this bloody drama. No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position.” Sympathisers to Bishop have attributed the government’s destruction to the party’s chief Marxist theoretician Bernard Coard, who has been roundly condemned for using ‘Stalinist’ tactics to slander Bishop - NJM leader Louison agreed with this, stating that “the revolution was destroyed from within.” Coard’s relations with the workers were not based on promoting their consciousness and mobilisation but on “administrative dictates and the persuasion of the gun” argued Trotskyite American journalist Steve Clark. Following Bishop’s public execution Castro labelled Coard a “hyena” who had “objectively destroyed the revolution and opened the door to imperialistic aggression.” The revolution in Grenada was thus an excellent example of how devastating internal dissent can be in a revolutionary movement. Castro never suffered too badly from this, and thus consolidated grip on power without the in-fighting witnessed in many other revolutionary movements, Grenada being the prime example. Marable exemplifies the crucial point that there existed two uneven and contradictory strains of socialism within the NJM. After the failure to sweep the despotic Gairy from power in 1973 the movement reassessed its strategy and tactics, adopting a more closely knit formation approximating a Leninist party - with its commitment to socialist goals bound to their beliefs in mass education, participation and popular mobilisation. However, attempts at gaining power legitimately through political means failed : the 1976 election under the ‘People’s Alliance’ banner failed in the face of repression and electoral rigging. Therefore, power would have to be seized. However, complicating the matter was the very nature of Grenadian society, which in stark contrast to Cuba, lacked a militant, leftist tradition inside the working class - if the NJM was to be successful it would not be a genuine social revolution, but a political insurrection. The original uprising was thus successful in 1979 due to the central concern of democratic rights. In order to appeal to all social classes socialism and class struggle were never mentioned. Bishop stated that “Cuba laid the basis for Grenada” - but did it? Certainly there were similarities - both were ruled under unpopular and despotic leaders, and broad sections of the bourgeoisie were anxious for political change. Yet the disconuities were far more profound - the Cuban proletariat had been receptive to the socialist policies of Castro, as originally outlined in the 1953 History Will Absolve Me speech, because of its rich history of class struggle and industrial organisations. The Grenadian working class was small and had no tradition of Marxism - furthermore, Castro could appeal to the revolutionary tradition of Jose Marti - presenting 1959 as a logical culmination of a century-long process, no such tradition could be presented in Grenada. The NJM was also unfortunate in that its existence coincided with some of Washington’s most defensive acts in the region - the Carter administration desperately tried to bolster the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979 and began a media-distorting campaign in an attempt to turn the people of Grenada against its new revolutionary government. The culmination of this turbulent period came with Bloody Wednesday in 1983 and the repression instigated by the Coard faction after the workers struck in solidarity with the arrested (and soon to be shot) Bishop. The theory of socialist orientation had been Coard’s method - yet Grenadian social realities had not conformed to the theory and thus coercion was used to mould society into alignment of a theory non-befitting the local conditions. Under a moderate, liberal and progressive Bishop government - the Grenadian revolution had succeeded - yet internal divisions over ideology tore it apart. We may therefore identify this as the crucial missing factor in Cuba - Castro’s leadership skills and tight control over the movement prevented such a disaster from befalling his insurrectionists.

Thus the differences between Cuba and the rest of the pan-American revolutionary attempts have been widely discussed and showcased. Cuba was an island of magnificent anti-imperialistic and rebellious history, with a people ready and willing to support an insurrection against a hated regime. Castro noted that, “the right to rebellion is at the very root of Cuba’s existence as a nation”. A fitting note of conclusion may be derived from the words of the Cuban National Anthem : “to live in chains is to live in disgrace and to die for one’s homeland is to live forever!”

The Conservative Party and Inter-War Dominance : An Investigation

The inter-war electoral dominance of the Conservatives can be attributed to several key factors that shaped the political period. Firstly, the unique situation presented after the Representation of the People Act in 1918, the rise of Labour, the disintegration of Liberalism and the changed nature of the political machine. These factors, coupled with the decision to restore the party system after the fall of the Lloyd George Coalition in 1922 proved a vitally significant decision for the future of the Conservative party. What was eventually restored in 1924 was a new party system much more favourable to the Conservatives than the old one - with Labour as the natural party of opposition. During the next seventy years, the Conservatives were to be out of power for only eighteen - this is revealing in assessing how generally positive the inter-war years were for the Conservatives. It would be generalising to claim that the Conservatives dominated for the whole period, the two labour regimes in 1924 and 1929 belie this fact, yet they emerged both times as the relatively uncontested majority party. Moreover, an unexpected opening in the party leadership with the death of Bonar Law in 1923 would be crucial in giving the party fresh impetus and ideas during the period. Stanley Baldwin himself must be considered a vital factor in the electoral dominance of the Conservatives. Baldwin was to be the pivotal figure in the government of Britain for the next decade and a half. Though his tenure was sometimes shaky, in the end he established an extraordinary grip on power. Maybe also there is something in the fact that the opposition to the Conservatives in the inter-war years was relatively weak. Labour was in a position to take government, but never did it hold onto power long, and the Liberals never really recovered from 1918 - despite some gains through the mid-twenties.

Therefore we can see two distinct shades of argument : one that the Conservatives (through a combination of leadership skills and electoral appeal) fashioned their own dominance ; one that situations and weakness of other parties aided this dominance. Certainly, the Conservatives showed tactical ineptitude in the 1923 election - Baldwin’s revival of the issue of tariff protection coming at a particularly bad time. But since the chain of events led to, within a year, an impressive consolidation of the Conservative position, Baldwin has largely been forgiven for the year out of office. Significantly, the Conservatives emerged from both Labour’s tenures stronger. The term ‘dominance’ must also be considered - total ‘dominance’ is never really possible within the political spectrum. The Liberal improvement in 1923 was substantial, showing surprising resilience in a party that had barely survived seven awful years. However, the major weakness now with the Liberals was that they had no real position to call their own. Labour had assumed the role of the major party on the Left, Conservatives on the Right. The Liberals fought on the Left in 1923 to oust Baldwin and then on the Right in 1924 to oust MacDonald. Therefore, there was no continuity to their policies - which undoubtedly cost them heavily with the electorate, who would much rather choose between Labour and Conservative. This can evidently be seen by the 1924 general election : what made it so significant to the fortunes of the Conservatives was the disaster which befell the Liberals. Their mere forty seats in Parliament wiped them off the political map in Urban England. Baldwin thus exerted an unprecedented amount of control - with over 400 MP’s, moreover his was a new Conservatism - seeking to establish a moderate consensus in opposition to Labour. This “New Conservatism” was determined to show itself as fit as any Labour government to legislate on social questions. This new, revised effort must be seen as crucial in the inter-war electoral dominance of the Conservative party.

It would certainly take a very different leader than Bonar Law to catapult the Conservative party into the national favour of the new electorate. The competition between Curzon and Baldwin showed a yearning for a new age of democratic politics - headed by the skilled, not the wealthy. Stanley Baldwin has an ability to communicate which made him both a shaper and an interpreter of opinion, a political skill becoming more and more important. Neville Chamberlain conceded that his leader, “provided something vital in retaining the floating vote.” The importance of this “floating” vote must not be brushed aside - Baldwin’s key skill lay in the cultivation of mood, something which would prove most important to ensuring Conservative dominance through the turbulent twenties and thirties. Furthermore, the BBC began broadcasting just five months before Baldwin first became Prime Minister and his career at the top coincided with the rise of radio as a major medium of national communication. He was thus the first British politician ever to become truly familiar to the voting public, a crucial factor in the over-riding dominance of his party. Significantly, he felt he had a vocation - “that is the binding together of all classes of our people in an effort to make life in this country better in every sense of the word.” In the European world of the totalitarian dictators of the 1930’s. this grounding of Baldwin’s appeal in the very ordinariness old English provincial life was in itself a contribution to the cause for democracy, at a time when it was most under threat. Baldwin’s Conservative party geared itself up for (successfully) a more democratic time ushered in by the completion of the extension of the franchise in 1928 - by opening its ranks to a wider participating membership than the party had ever known. Moreover, it is important to emphasise the extremely efficient and proactive members of Baldwin’s Cabinet, most notably Neville Chamberlain on Social Reform and Winston Churchill at the Exchequer. Some accounts suggest that whatever Baldwin’s role in high politics and internal party affairs, he was irrelevant to the party’s electoral fortunes. Yet Baldwin did present a positive appeal which commanded admiration across party divides, this in itself constituted a tremendous electoral asses for the Conservatives. Baldwin’s anxieties were shared by almost all Conservatives in the 1920’s : that the emergence of independent working class politics in the context of a ‘new electorate’ might condemn their party to permanent minority. Baldwin’s response to this must be seen as the crucial factor in accounting for the Conservative dominance in the inter-war period : to adopt an inclusive attitude towards the new voters.

Baldwin’s ‘non-political’ persona also magnified his ability to achieve political objectives. Though merciless to the Labour party electorally he was amicable to Labour politically. He did not speak of workers merely as factors of production nor as an underclass, but as fellow countrymen. He treated them as a legitimate part of the political and industrial systems - perhaps the most example coming from his conciliatory gestures towards the trade unions in 1925, which left a favourable impression in potentially unfavourable circumstances. This readiness to see good in the ‘other’ side, and the over-riding desire to end conflict, gave Baldwin a strong appeal to the people as a whole. Furthermore, the work done under Baldwin gave significant leverage to the Conservative pull to the new voters. Income tax was further reduced by Churchill in 1926 and most of the government’s social programme, initiated by Chamberlain, worked out according to plan. Even when faced with serious agitation, the Conservatives seemed to emerge relatively unscathed. Baldwin’s will to win the dispute of the “General Strike” was absolute and he used his communicative skills to great effect in radio broadcasts. Significantly, the Prime Minister also prevented hawkish ministers like Churchill from stirring up anti-socialist sentiments and further inflaming the situation. Baldwin thus gained much credit for the defeat of the strikers after nine days - a potentially fatal situation had been diffused brilliantly. Yet when seeking re-election in 1929 the party had no unifying theme except “Safety First”, despite Labour moving back to moderation after the failure of the strikes. With hindsight, the 1929 election was a good one to lose, yet the example of 1923 and 1929 had shown that there was enough residual loyalty to Liberalism and enough trust in MacDonald’s Labour despite this so-called Conservative dominance. However, the fate of the second Labour government was largely bound up with the performance of the economy - the Wall Street Crash that same year would severely test Labour to the extremes. The ‘workshop of the world’ had fallen on hard times - it was little surprise therefore that the impetus went away from Free Trade towards protectionism. This may well be considered circumstantial for the Conservatives and to an extent this is true. The Great Depression initiated by the Wall Street Crash created a wave of protectionist sentiment in 1930-31 that would have been unheard of in the previous quarter-century.

Since everything turned on confidence, a Labour government that did not inspire confidence on Wall Street was not in a strong position. MacDonald did the right thing : save the country at the cost of Labour’s independence. Conservative hegemony would return under the face of the National Government. Therefore, the economic situation had been favourable to the Conservatives - this much is certainly true, their policies would appear much more favourable in a time of economic depression. Baldwin’s decision to accept the Lord Presidency rather than the Premiership of the National Government would prove to be crucial : the Conservatives would come out of the crisis in a good light. The crisis atmosphere rallied support to a government which promised to take a grip on the situation, the initiatve had passed to the Conservatives. Significantly, the National Government was like the Coalition in 1918 that its majority was largely compose of Conservative MP’s. The election in 1931 pitted Labour against the rest - and outside the industrial coalfields, Labour was destroyed - its reputation tarnished by the events in 1929 as the Liberals during the Great War had been. Everything now pointed towards the tariffs - the Conservatives’ principles and protectionist sentiment could be found all over the country. Furthermore, lowering unemployment and the maintenance of higher average real income provided a serviceable platform for the National Government when it came to fight a general election. Further social reforms included tightening factory legislation, setting up the London Passenger Transport Board and providing the first national slum clearance campaigns. Expectedly Baldwin triumphantly returned in 1935 at the head of 429 MP’s. The government’s success in 1935 certainly owed something to the continuity disarray of Labour, which took a considerable time to recover from the loss of office. If the 1935 results are compared with those of 1929 the net effect of the 1929 crisis becomes apparent - Labour stayed fairly level, while the Conservatives had put 10% on their vote at the expense of the Liberals. The change to a more or less two party system put the Conservatives into a commanding position. Under Baldwin, the Conservative party had made a more effective, broad-based appeal to the public than a opposition which crucially still lacked credibility.

The National Government was therefore also of crucial importance in maintaining Conservative dominance, albeit in different form and under a different name, during the interwar years. Significantly these years were unlike any before them since social and political change caused primarily by war and electoral reform transformed the contours of party debate. MP’s contemplated their new audience, almost acknowledging that politics could never be the same again. Many Conservatives wondered whether their party could ever successfully appeal to the more assertive and militant working class they believed the war to have created. The inter-war period does represent a fundamental disjuncture in the development of Conservative attitudes to class and the wider relationship between themselves and the people. A more pluralistic interpretation of class politics became central to Baldwin’s New Conservatism. This transition crucially underpinned the development of Baldwin’s supremacy. The widespread belief that the Representation of the People Act had ushered in a new political world, dominated by working class potential Labour voters played a critical role in shaping Conservative orientation during the inter-war years. The importance of electoral reform to the Conservatives related to the construction of a central framework of reference in the transformation of a party ideology. Too close a public identification with property ownership rendered the party vulnerable to socialist accusations of defending inequality. Therefore in predominantly working class areas, candidates met Labour’s ‘proletarian’ rhetoric with assurances of their own working class credentials. Critical to this change of Conservative consciousness was the enfranchisement of women in 1918 and 1928. Whatever the intellectual shortcomings of women , female suffrage proved a uniquely effective way of diluting the political power of organised labour. The vast expansion of personal taxation during the war opened up the possibility of the same at national level, the claim that socialism would cost voters money would be an effective propaganda machine. The Conservatives learnt to distinguish the component elements of the working class, and to appeal to specific interest groups - examples including trade unionists undercut by foreign imports, housewives and small savers. The Conservative party prevailed by spreading its defence of vested interests to encompass the whole community. For example, the party committed itself to the defence of working class property from confiscatory socialist taxation. Such working class inclusive policies must be considered a key factor in the Conservatives’ electoral appeal.

The inter-war period represented a critical turning point in the history of Conservative popular politics. Most Conservatives believed that the rules of the political game had been irreversibly changed in 1918. Thus forced to confront their political demons, Conservatives began to take an increasingly critical look at their political message and its intended audience. As they did so, they liberated themselves from the decaying Edwardian Unionism that had played favourably into the hands of the Liberals. The new context of taxation, perceptible evidence of working class vested and the enfranchisement of women convinced the Conservatives that there was no single elusive working class electorate to capture. The heterogeneity and inclusiveness of the post-war electorate opened up many political doors - recognising this, the Conservatives articulated a more sophisticated language of class in their policy making - one that acknowledged the diversity of its new audience.

This perhaps might well be the biggest factor in the dominance of the party in the inter-war years, but we must not forget the contribution of Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister. Churchill remarked in 1935 that Baldwin was, “a statesman who has gathered to himself a greater volume of confidence and goodwill than any public man I recollect in my long career”. It is a combination of the two, coupled with some fortunate circumstances which conspired against Labour (1929 for example) that best account for the inter-war electoral dominance of the Conservative party.


Bibliography

R. Blake : The Conservative Party from Peel to Major
M. Bentley : Public and Private Doctrine : Essays in British History
A. Seldon, S. Ball : Conservative Century
J. Ramsden : An Appetite for Power : The Conservative Party since 1900
P. Williamson : Stanley Baldwin
D. Jarvis : British Conservatism and Class Politics in the 1920’s : English Historical Review, (cxi 1996)
P. Clarke : Hope and Glory : Britain 1900-1990