The Cuban Revolutionary Movement

“Why did Cuba have the most successful revolutionary movement in the Caribbean?”


The second half of the 20th Century witnessed multiple revolutionary attempts at government overhaul in the Caribbean and South America. With the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua, they failed amidst a tide of internal dissent within the revolutionaries ranks and brutal repression. The biggest success story, undoubtedly, is that of Castro’s July 26th Movement in Cuba. Therefore, what made Cuba different from the struggles, say, in Grenada or the Dominican Republic? There are certainly political factors : such as the unpopularity of the Batista regime, geographical factors : such as the mountainous nature of Cuba giving advantage to the guerrillas - but also historical factors : such as Cuba’s tradition of anti-imperialistic rebellion. Castro’s History Will Absolve Me highlights many of these features unique to Cuban political life : and thus attempts to justify the success of the revolution in these terms. The Cuban example has clear advantages when compared to other revolutionary movements of the period. Excellent leadership and loyalty can be cited as one case, as can the weakness of Batista and the reluctance (until 1961!) of US intervention. Added to this was the crucial local support given to Castro’s insurrectionists - where other movements throughout the region failed to convince multiple sectors of society of the validity of the cause, Cuba’s exploited working class (and, indeed, many petty bourgeoisie) became vital supporters of Castro’s movement. The failures of attempted coups after Cuba’s success in 1959 suggests that Cuba was unique in June opponents of dictator Trujillo landed in the Dominican Republic but were killed upon landing - there were no survivors to carry the fight into the mountains, as had occurred in Cuba. The implosion of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada later in the century also highlighted the extent to which internal divisions had hampered revolutionary movements in pan-America - Castro’s grip on power was secure, the Cuban insurrectionists suffered few of these problems, and thus succeeded where others failed.

Castro’s infamous 1953 History Will Absolve Me speech, coupled with Che Guevara’s writings on the art of guerrilla warfare provide an excellent primary blueprint helping to explain the success in Cuba. Castro makes strong reference to Jose Marti, the hero of the Cuban anti-imperialists in the 19th Century, imploring, “I carry on the teachings of the Master [Marti] in my heart, and in my mind the noble ideas of all men who have defended people’s freedom everywhere.” Cuba remained under Spanish rule until the very end of the 19th Century - anti-colonial activity was almost continuous, the very nature of the Cuban poor was rebellion towards foreign rule. Further to this, Castro makes a vicious attack upon the Cuban establishment : questioning the Batista regime’s political legitimacy and its popularity with the soldiers, small businessmen and sugar plantation workers - “the dictatorship that oppresses the nation is not a constitutional power, but an unconstitutional one”. Castro duly highlights the many ills of the regime : from its corporate dealings damaging Cuba’s sugar-dependent economy, to its vicious repression at the hands of the SIM secret police. As early as 1953 Castro seems convinced the people of Cuba are already on the side of the revolutionaries, remarking that “If Moncada had fallen into our hands, even the women of Cuba would have risen in arms.” Castro makes his case to each sector of Cuban society : and in this we may see one of the unique factors within the Cuban revolutionary movement, it was able to appeal to large cross-sectors of society - rather than isolated one group, Castro went for them all. He appeals to the soldiers, claiming they are being used by the Batista regime - to the unemployed, the seasonal sugar plantation workers without “an inch of land” to call their own, exploited industrial workers, small businessmen burdened with debt and young professionals with “all doors closed to them”. The five revolutionary laws to be implemented by July 26th appealed to broad sections of society - and thus strengthened the popularity and extent of support behind the movement. Constitutional power to the people, ownership of land to tenant farmers, workers given a 30% profit in large industries, sugar planters a right to share 55% of production and confiscation of illegally gotten property made for a sweeping and popular program of revolutionary change. Crucially, we may also add to this freedom from the American political and economic straitjacket - “Cuba should be the bulwark of liberty and not a shameful link in the chain of despotism.” This would have received extra support uniquely in Cuba due to their relationship with the US, the existence of the Platt Amendment and the United Fruit Company dominating the Cuban political and economic scene. Anti-Americanism was a recurring theme in mainstream Cuban politics and media : one Havana newspaper proclaimed in 1922 after unwelcome developments in the sugar industry, “hatred of North America will be the religion of Cubans.”

The question that must be asked therefore, is why did the US not intervene sooner to prevent Castro’s victory in 1959? They certainly had the capacity, as they had shown in investing arms and ‘military advisors’ in Vietnam for many years. Cuba’s geography may well have helped - Castro’s insurgents were holed up in rugged and mountainous terrain that few regular forces could penetrate. Maybe it is with the US’ relationship with Batista in which we may identify the inherent weakness of the latter’s regime. The US needed local instruments through with to project power - but it had aligned itself with a flawed, weak, corrupt, ineffective and deeply unpopular regime it ultimately could not control, similarly to Chaing Kai-Shek in China or Diem in South Vietnam. We could also tie in the popularity of Castro with the inaction of US intervention - the US could not control or crush such a strong leader or stem the cascading popular support his movement generated. It also may be seen that US officials over-estimated the ability of the Cuban armed forces. The Cuban military was corrupt, ill-trained and poorly commanded - the will to fight was lacking among Batista’s troops, especially when compared with the dedicated guerrillas. Castro makes reference to this also - “the army suffered three times as many casualties [at Moncada] as we did - because our men were expertly trained.” The lack of US involvement may also have been down to the perceived notion that Castro was not a communist - deeming the situation manageable when compared to events such as Berlin and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the non-involvement of the US undoubtedly gave Castro’s forces an added advantage. Witness the ease with which the entrance of the US military ended progressive forces in Guatemala in 1954 and Grenada in 1983 and it is clear just how much of an advantage Castro had not facing US wrath before success in 1959.Thus, the uniqueness of the Cuban revolution derives from a set of conditioning factors - socio-economic popularity of the revolutionaries’ program, leadership and the interaction of Cuban history with world (specifically with regards to the US) politics.

The revolutionaries appealed to the sectors of society disenchanted with the Batista regime : such as the large black population - Castro found it highly advantageous for discrediting Batista to propound the ‘instant liberation’ for thousands of previously disadvantaged black Cubans. Furthermore, the key area of conflict and thus future revolutionary policy was undoubtedly the countryside. Illiteracy, poverty, dreadful health and seasonal unemployment were all rife - there were few schools, fewer clinics, bad roads, impure water supplies and little electricity. The country’s substantial resource base was only partially exploited, for the advantages of the few businessmen in control, and under foreign control. The popularity enjoyed by the policies of July 26th can therefore be no surprise when looking at the situation in the countryside under Batista. With regards to leadership, the revolution was incarnate with Fidel Castro. Because of Castro’s dominant personality and political effectiveness, Cuba’s revolutionary progress was not paralysed by inter-elite struggles as befell many other insurrectionary movements in the Caribbean. With regards to Cuban history, Castro skilfully portrayed the struggle as rooted in decades of imperial exploitation and a popular and essential one. Castro’s Cuba was a child both of the contemporary times and the centuries-old Cuban revolutionary tradition - a truly popular indigenous movement sufficiently shaped by Cuban history, geography, economy, culture and personalities. It would therefore be wise to identify the failings of the insurrectionary movements elsewhere and compare conditions with those of Cuba. Take the example of Venezuela - most of the guerrillas were disenchanted members of the military and middle class parties - they could not forge a link with the people and thus ultimately failed. Yet, even when guerrillas attempted to achieve their aims by making common cause with the aspirations of the indigenous peasants they often still failed - as in the cases of Peru and Bolivia. In the latter case, even with the heroic Guevara aiding the guerrilla’s efforts they were betrayed by Monje, the leader of the Bolivian Communist Party and hunted down by the oppressive regime and CIA. Perhaps the most similar example to the Cuban case came from Nicaragua. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) gained power in 1979 after gaining momentum in the 1970’s through garnering peasant support in the north central regions. Similarly to Batista, the Sandinista’s position as viable opposition was given credence by the abuses committed by the dictator Somoza. Despite ideological rifts, the rebels overcame their factional differences and accepted the leadership of the most moderate faction - thus accomplishing its objectives through the creation of a multi-class alliance, similarly to Cuba, that coalesced to overwhelm the resistance of a redundant dictatorship.

Most guerrilla movements have been defeated because of lack of unity, lack of popular support or US intervention paired with guerrilla’s ignorance of local conditions. The overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala by a coalition of forces, including the CIA, highlights that even sometimes popular support and policies were not enough. The revolutionaries in the continent were able to draw important lessons from the Guatemalan experience : a revolution which did not go all the way in dispossessing the wealthy and giving the peasants and poorer classes a solid stake in the revolution. Furthermore, the case of Peru further highlights certain factors present in Cuba yet not elsewhere, that thus contributed to the failure of other insurrectionary movements. Luis de la Puente and members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) chose to emulate the Cuban rebels and being a guerrilla struggle in the Andean countryside in 1962. However, ignorant of the peculiarities of the terrain and betrayed by one of his closes followers (unlike the loyalty of the Cuban guerrillas) and unable to win the support of the people, de la Puente was killed in 1965 by the army. In three years the guerrilla movement had been totally liquidated - with the urban centres and mountain regions failing to act in support of the guerrillas. Add to this the disagreement which existed within the left - the Peru case showcased the futility of squabbles between Trotskyite and Communist factions within a revolutionary movement, which, as we shall see, ruined the New Jewel Movement’s chances of rule in Grenada. In Peru, the guerrillas lacked the necessary ability to adapt rapidly, not only to the terrain, but also to the daily life, language and customs of the peasants - as has been the priority of the July 26th Movement. Ideas promoted by the Peruvian revolutionaries appeared remote to the peasants, who were interested in local demands whilst the guerrillas advocated intricate and theoretical socialist revolution.

Therefore the factors which propelled Castro’s rebels to power were also the same factors for the failures of other movements across Latin America and the Caribbean. When movements across the region attempted to perform a copy-cat revolution akin to Cuba, they invariably failed. Local dynamics and structures had to be taken into account - as has been highlighted, Cuba was unique in its political culture, geography and economic situation. It certainly appeared as though Grenada would be the first predominantly black state to emulate Cuba and carry through a successful armed socialist revolution in 1979. The Cuban government astutely noted in 1983, of the revolution’s failure, “the division among the Grenadian revolutionaries led to this bloody drama. No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position.” Sympathisers to Bishop have attributed the government’s destruction to the party’s chief Marxist theoretician Bernard Coard, who has been roundly condemned for using ‘Stalinist’ tactics to slander Bishop - NJM leader Louison agreed with this, stating that “the revolution was destroyed from within.” Coard’s relations with the workers were not based on promoting their consciousness and mobilisation but on “administrative dictates and the persuasion of the gun” argued Trotskyite American journalist Steve Clark. Following Bishop’s public execution Castro labelled Coard a “hyena” who had “objectively destroyed the revolution and opened the door to imperialistic aggression.” The revolution in Grenada was thus an excellent example of how devastating internal dissent can be in a revolutionary movement. Castro never suffered too badly from this, and thus consolidated grip on power without the in-fighting witnessed in many other revolutionary movements, Grenada being the prime example. Marable exemplifies the crucial point that there existed two uneven and contradictory strains of socialism within the NJM. After the failure to sweep the despotic Gairy from power in 1973 the movement reassessed its strategy and tactics, adopting a more closely knit formation approximating a Leninist party - with its commitment to socialist goals bound to their beliefs in mass education, participation and popular mobilisation. However, attempts at gaining power legitimately through political means failed : the 1976 election under the ‘People’s Alliance’ banner failed in the face of repression and electoral rigging. Therefore, power would have to be seized. However, complicating the matter was the very nature of Grenadian society, which in stark contrast to Cuba, lacked a militant, leftist tradition inside the working class - if the NJM was to be successful it would not be a genuine social revolution, but a political insurrection. The original uprising was thus successful in 1979 due to the central concern of democratic rights. In order to appeal to all social classes socialism and class struggle were never mentioned. Bishop stated that “Cuba laid the basis for Grenada” - but did it? Certainly there were similarities - both were ruled under unpopular and despotic leaders, and broad sections of the bourgeoisie were anxious for political change. Yet the disconuities were far more profound - the Cuban proletariat had been receptive to the socialist policies of Castro, as originally outlined in the 1953 History Will Absolve Me speech, because of its rich history of class struggle and industrial organisations. The Grenadian working class was small and had no tradition of Marxism - furthermore, Castro could appeal to the revolutionary tradition of Jose Marti - presenting 1959 as a logical culmination of a century-long process, no such tradition could be presented in Grenada. The NJM was also unfortunate in that its existence coincided with some of Washington’s most defensive acts in the region - the Carter administration desperately tried to bolster the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979 and began a media-distorting campaign in an attempt to turn the people of Grenada against its new revolutionary government. The culmination of this turbulent period came with Bloody Wednesday in 1983 and the repression instigated by the Coard faction after the workers struck in solidarity with the arrested (and soon to be shot) Bishop. The theory of socialist orientation had been Coard’s method - yet Grenadian social realities had not conformed to the theory and thus coercion was used to mould society into alignment of a theory non-befitting the local conditions. Under a moderate, liberal and progressive Bishop government - the Grenadian revolution had succeeded - yet internal divisions over ideology tore it apart. We may therefore identify this as the crucial missing factor in Cuba - Castro’s leadership skills and tight control over the movement prevented such a disaster from befalling his insurrectionists.

Thus the differences between Cuba and the rest of the pan-American revolutionary attempts have been widely discussed and showcased. Cuba was an island of magnificent anti-imperialistic and rebellious history, with a people ready and willing to support an insurrection against a hated regime. Castro noted that, “the right to rebellion is at the very root of Cuba’s existence as a nation”. A fitting note of conclusion may be derived from the words of the Cuban National Anthem : “to live in chains is to live in disgrace and to die for one’s homeland is to live forever!”